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Abstract
This study presents a simple two-country model in which rms in the
manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show
how trade costs and productivity levels aect technology choices by the rms
in each country, where the xed cost of adopting high technology diers. This
depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if
productivity is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology
gap between the countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity
of the high-technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the
country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare
loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be
reduced.
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1 Introduction
Production technologies have evolved signicantly over a long period of time. Conse-
quently, industries are able to choose various technologies to produce goods. Highly
productive technologies have been developed in some industrialized countries and
may be available in other countries. At the same time, technology gaps exist be-
tween countries through the technology choices of each rm, especially where tech-
nology is highly developed. It is sometimes said that one of the main reasons for
the existence of such technology gaps is that production circumstances dier among
countries. When a country whose productivity is not developed attempts to adopt
a new technology, the country tends to incur more adoption costs than a country
whose productivity is developed. To adopt the new technology, the following are
required: absorption of costs, development of laws, and developed infrastructure,
including nancial systems and major railways; moreover, additional costs dier
among developing countries. In addition to such technology issues, we must con-
sider the eect of trade costs, which are a key determinant of international trade.
In the context of the new trade theory of Krugman(1980), trade costs determine
whether full agglomeration or partial agglomeration arises; in addition, such costs
aect welfare levels. Hence, we must analyze the eects of technology advances on
economic performance by considering trade costs. Such an analysis enables discus-
sion of the manner of technology improvement in an economy with international
trade.
In this study, we incorporate technology choice by rms in a two-country model.
In each country, there are two sectors: the manufacturing sector, whose rms com-
pete via monopolistic competition, and the agricultural sector, which is perfectly
competitive. Labor is the only production factor. We assume that rms can choose
a production technology to produce manufacturing goods from two types of tech-
nology: high or low. By adopting high technology, rms can produce manufacturing
goods at a lower marginal cost and however, need a higher xed cost than rms that
adopt low technology. A theoretical feature of our model is that such a xed-cost
level depends on the location in which the rm adopts high technology. We can
analyze how the trade costs and productivity levels of technology determine rms'
agglomeration patterns and technology choices by examining rms in equilibrium.
In addition, we can analyze how exogenous changes of trade costs and productivity
levels aect welfare levels of consumers in each country and obtain the implications
of the reduction in trade costs for each country in the case of a technology gap. In
equilibrium, the model shows that a technology gap arises when the trade cost is not
too low and the productivity level of high technology is medium. In addition, we nd
that an increase in the productivity level of the high technology always decreases
the welfare level in a country in which low technology us adopted, while it increases
the welfare level of a country in which high technology is adopted. These results
indicate that technology needs to improve with decreasing trade costs in order not
to decrease the welfare level of the low-technology country.
Our model is based mainly on Martin and Rogers (1991), although they assume
that all rms face an identical technology. We incorporate technology choice into
2
their model. There are many theoretical studies that focus on dierences in pro-
duction technology in trade theory.1 There is far less research on technology choice
in the new trade theory. Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) incorporate technology
choice into their trade models in a similar way to ours. However, both of the previ-
ous studies focus on the technology gap within a country, which is generated from
the heterogeneity of labor skills or a rm's ex ante productivity.2 In our model,
we analyze the eect of the technology gap between countries, while the previous
studies are unable to discuss. Furthermore, we can discuss the eects of technologi-
cal improvement on welfare levels, while mentioning the policy implications of trade
liberalization.
The key to generate the technology gap between countries is that we represent
the dierence in productivity circumstances of adopting high technology on the xed
costs of increasing-return technology. Although xed costs are identical in previous
studies, in our model, there is a dierence in the ease of entry because each country
varies in terms of entry regulations, nancial support, or the absorption costs of
adopting new technology. By assuming such dierences, we can focus on the rela-
tionship between adopted technology and the productivity environment represented
by the degree of xed-cost levels and we can obtain additional implications about
the eects on economic performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections as follows. In Section
2, we present the model. In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium. In Section 4,
we analyze the eects of a reduction in international trade costs and an increase
in productivity on the welfare level of consumers, and derive the implications for
technology innovation and trade liberalization. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries, called country 1 and 2. Variables referring to country 1
have the subscript 1, and those referring to country 2 have the subscript 2. Each
country is endowed with a xed amount of labor, L1 and L2, respectively.
We assume that agents in both countries obtain their utility from consumption
of homogeneous agricultural goods and dierentiated manufactured goods. Labor
can be used to produce agricultural goods and dierentiated manufactured goods.
While labor can be mobile between sectors in the same country, it cannot be mobile
between the two countries.
1Melitz's (2003) model, in which each rm faces uncertain productivity determined by its distri-
bution, provides rationale for the widely observed phenomenon that only high-productivity rms
export to foreign markets. Since then, many subsequent studies have accumulated: Baldwin and
Okubo (2006), Bernard et al. (2003, 2007), and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).They assume that
the technology gap between rms is given by the distribution function.
2In Yeaple's (2005) model, rms choose both their individual production technologies and types
of workers, which are explained as giving rise to the dierence between exporters and non-exporters.
Hence, the technology choices of rms change by the distribution of labor skills in equilibrium.
Bustos (2013) incorporates technology choice into the trade model with heterogeneity of rms to
test consistency empirically. The model explains that the technology gap within a country arises
from rm heterogeneity.
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2.1 Demand
The utility function of agents in country i (i = 1; 2) is given by
Ui = Ai +  lnMi; (1)
where
Mi =
Z ni
0
mii(j)
 1
 dj +
Z ni0
0
mi0i(j
0)
 1
 dj0
 
 1
;  > 1; i; i0 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= i0: (2)
Here, Ai is consumption of the agricultural goods in country i, Mi is consumption
of a composite of the manufactured goods in country i, and  is a weight on the
utility from consumption of the manufactured goods. mii0(j) denotes consumption
of a variety j of the manufactured good in country i0 produced in country i. ni is
the number of varieties produced by a rm in country i.  represents the elasticity
of substitution among dierentiated goods.
The budget constraint of the agent in country i becomes
yi 
2X
i0=1
Z ni0
0
pi0i(j)mi0i(j)dj + Ai; (3)
where pii0(j) denotes the price of a variety j of the manufactured goods in country
i0 produced in country i and yi denotes the income level in country i. We take
homogeneous agricultural goods as the numeraire. Then, we can obtain the following
demand functions
mi0i =
pi0i(j)
 
P 1 i
; (4)
Ai = yi   ; (5)
Pi =
"
2X
i=1
Z ni
0
pi0i(j)
1 dj
# 1
1 
; (6)
where Pi stands for the \price index" in country i.
2.2 Production
Each good is produced by using only labor and each worker has one unit of labor.
We describe the production structure of the agricultural sector. The agricultural
goods market is perfectly competitive and taken as a numeraire. We assume that in
both countries, one unit of agricultural goods is produced with one unit of labor and
that the international trade of homogeneous goods incurs no trade costs. Therefore,
the equilibrium wages in the two countries are w1 = w2 = 1. Because we assume free
entry into the manufacturing sector, prots in the sector become zero, and therefore,
income is equal to the wage, that is, yi = wi = 1.
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2.2.1 Manufacturing sector and technology choice
In the manufacturing sector, monopolistic competition prevails and each rm pro-
duces a dierentiated good. There are two types of technologies for producing each
variety of manufacturing goods. The amount of goods a worker can produce is given
by az, z 2 {H;L}. z is an index to indicate the adopted technology for production.
z = H refers to high technology for producing manufacturing goods, and z = L
refers to low technology for producing the same goods. High technology is more
productive than low technology, that is, aH > aL = 1.
To produce with technology z 2 {H;L} in country i, a rm in country i is
required to pay a xed cost f zi . Since we consider low technology to be old or well
known, the xed cost of adopting it is assumed to be
fL1 = f
L
2  fL: (7)
That is, the rms in both countries incur the same level of xed cost if they adopt
the technology L. On the other hand, for high technology, we assume that the
level of such a xed cost depends on which technology the rm employs and which
country it locates in, as follows
fL < fH1 < f
H
2 : (8)
The rst inequality means that high technology is more costly. The rms bear a
large cost to adopt the high technology because it incurs large equipment investment,
payment of license fees, and so on. The second inequality represents dierences in
productivity circumstances for high technology between the countries because of
dierences in support systems by governments, such as subsidies to adopt high
technology, infrastructure development, and absorption of costs in a skill-abundant
country versus one with scarce skills. In other words, we assume that country 1
has an advantage in introducing technology H over country 2. This assumption
represents a diering degree-of-entry barrier between one country and another and
is key for generating a technology gap between the countries.
Potential rms can enter production activities freely as long as their prots are
positive and they can choose to employ a more protable technology. Each manu-
facturing rm faces the demand function, (4) and thus sets the following constant
markup price
pz11 = p
z
22 =

(   1)az ; (9)
where pzii denotes the price of the manufactured good in country i produced in
country i by technology z. The international trade of manufactured goods incurs
\iceberg"-type trade costs. If a rm in one country sends one unit of its good to the
other country, it must dispatch  units of the good.    1 > 0 represents the trade
costs. Thus, the price of imported manufactured goods in country i becomes pii0
and i 6= i0. Thus, the price index in country i can be written as
Pi =

   1

nHi + n
L
i + '(n
H
i0 + n
L
i0)
 1
1  ; i; i0 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= i0; (10)
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where '   1  and   a 1H . ' represents the freeness of trade. ' = 0 corresponds
to the case of autarky, whereas ' = 1 implies free trade. In other words, increasing
' means trade liberalization.  corresponds to the gap of productivity between
technologies and   1. From Eqs. (4) to (9), prots of a rm in countries 1 and 2
can be expressed as follows
Hi =
 
(   1)1 
 
LiP
 1
i + 'Li0P
 1
i0
  fHi (11)
Li =
 
(   1)1 
 
LiP
 1
i + 'Li0P
 1
i0
  fL: (12)
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, agglomeration patterns and technology choices are determined by
the two parameters,  and '. In this section, we analyze how rms choose the
technologies and derive the equilibrium number of rms, with close attention to the
existing conditions of rms in both countries.
Although in practice rms in the same country can choose either technology
for production, in our model, each rm in a country chooses the same technology
in equilibrium because of the homogeneity of rms. Which technology it chooses
mainly depends on the productivity level of the high technology relative to the xed
costs of the high technology adopted in the country. Specically, technology choice
by rms in country i depends on whether the productivity level  is greater than the
relative xed costs of the technologies,
fHi
fL
. We can summarize this as the following
lemma
Lemma 1 1. If  <
fH1
fL
, then all rms in countries 1 and 2 choose technology
L.
2. If
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
, rms in country 1 adopt technology H whereas rms in
country 2 adopt technology L.
3. If
fH2
fL
< , then all rms choose technology H.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We can categorize specialization of technology into three cases according to 
from Lemma 1. When  is suciently low(
fH1
fL
> ), all rms choose technology
L (low technology case). This case is consistent with the results of Helpman and
Krugman (1985). On the other hand, when  takes moderate value, rms in country
1 adopt technology H whereas rms in country 2 adopt technology L. In this case,
a technology gap exists between the countries (technology gap case). When  is
suciently high, all rms in both countries choose technology H since adopting
technology H is protable in both countries (high technology case).
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In what follows, we derive the equilibrium number of manufactured goods (rms)
when
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
.3 To focus on a clear and interesting case, we consider L1 > L2.
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As in the previous literature, the freeness of trade determines whether partial
agglomeration equilibrium or full agglomeration occurs. Partial agglomeration arises
when the following holds
H1 = 
L
2 = 0: (13)
The price index in this case becomes
P1 =

   1(n
H
1 + 'n
L
2 )
1
1 
P2 =

   1(n
L
2 + 'n
H
1 )
1
1  :
Thus, free-entry condition (13) can be rewritten as


(
L1
nH1 + 'n
L
2
+
'L2
nL2 + 'n
H
1
) = fH1 (14)


(
L2
nL2 + 'n
H
1
+
'L2
nH1 + 'n
L
2
) = fL: (15)
Dividing (14) by (15), we obtain the relationship between nH1 and n
L
2 as follows
nH1 =
['(L1 + L2)f
H
1   (L1 + '2L2)fL]
['(L1 + L2)fL  ('2L1 + L2)fH1 )]
nL2 : (16)
The numerator of Eq. (16) is always negative but the sign of the denominator
depends on '. Therefore, the denominator must be negative in equilibrium; that is,
the following inequality must hold5
'(L1 + L2)f
L < ('2L1 + L2)f
H
1 : (17)
We dene '() as follows,
'()(L1 + L2)f
L = ('2L1 + L2)f
H
1 : (18)
'() denes a relationship between  and ' that is satised when (17) holds as an
equality. If ' < '(), Eq. (17) can hold and the manufacturing rms locate in both
countries in equilibrium.6 From Eq. (16) and the free-entry condition 1 = 0, we
can obtain the number of manufacturing rms locating in country 2 as follows
nL2 =
['(L1 + L2)F
L  ('2L1 + L2)fH1 ]
(fL  fH1 ')(fL'  fH1 )
: (19)
3Similarly, we can derive other cases. See Appendix B.
4Similarly, we can discuss the other cases, in which L1  L2.
5If Eq. (17) does not hold, that is H1 > 
L
2 , then the rms agglomerate to country 1 in
equilibrium. In other words, when ' is too high, the full agglomeration arises.
6When '  '(), all manufacturing rms locate in country 1.
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Figure 1: The patterns of location and technology choice
Hence, we obtain the Eq. (20) of manufacturing rms locating in country 1 as
follows,
nH1 =
['(L1 + L2)f
H
1   (L1 + '2L2)fL]
(fL  fH1 ')(fL'  fH1 )
: (20)
We can summarize the preceding arguments as follows
Proposition 1 A technology gap exists between countries if the following inequali-
ties are satised
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
' < '()
In this case, partial agglomeration equilibrium arises and rms locating in country
1 employ technology H and rms in country 2 employ technology L.
This proposition indicates that when the productivity of high technology is not
suciently high and it is costly to trade goods, a technology gap exists.
As mentioned before, the type of technology that rms in each country adopt
and whether full agglomeration arises depend on the relationship between ' and .
Hence, this can be summarized as shown in Figure 1. The vertical axis represents
the productivity level  of technology H ( > 1). The horizontal axis represents
the freeness of trade, ' (0 < ' < 1). Figure 1 shows how these parameters aect
equilibrium and how the technology choice and agglomeration of rms depend on 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and '. From Proposition 1, the technology gap case arises when the combination of
 and ' is in the domain (II).
As ' becomes larger, full agglomeration tends to arise. Two factors aect the
agglomeration pattern: the dierence in market size and the xed costs of adopting
high technology in each country. In the low productivity case, only the dierence in
market size generates agglomeration power since rms face the same level of xed
costs. However, we start from the point at which both  and ' are low enough to
be in (III). Increasing the productivity level  from the starting point to a medium
level, only rms in country 1 change to the high-technology type. When  reaches
a high level in (I), rms in country 2 catch up with the high-technology type.
Next, we analyze the eects of a change in the productivity level of high technol-
ogy on the number of manufacturing rms. Dierentiating nH1 and n
L
2 with respect
to , we can obtain the following derivatives
@ lnnH1
@
= fL'

('2   1)L2fH1
['(L1 + L2)fH1   (L1 + '2L2)fL][fL  fH1 ']
  '
fLa 1H '  fH1

> 0
,
@ lnnL2
@
=
'(L1 + L2)f
L
'(L1 + L2)fL  ('2L1 + L2)fH1
+
'(fL + fH1 )(f
L  fH1 )
(fH1   fL')(fL  fH1 ')
< 0:
Therefore, the following proposition can be obtained
Proposition 2 Productivity improvement of technology H increases the number of
manufacturing rms locating in country 1 that adopt high technology but decreases
the number of manufacturing rms in country 2 that adopt low technology.
We provide an intuition as follows. Technology improvement increases the prot of
rms locating in country 1 because improvement can reduce the marginal cost of
adopting high technology; then, more manufacturing rms enter country 1.
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine the welfare eects of trade liberalization and technology
improvement, which correspond to increases in ' and . In addition, we analyze
the comparative statics of these parameters. We focus on the case in which the
technology adopted diers between countries.
First, substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (1), we obtain the following indirect utility
functions in the countries
V1 = 1  + [ln (   1)

] +
1
   1 ln
(1  '2)L1
(fH1   fL')
(21)
V2 = 1  + [ln (   1)

] +
1
   1 ln
(1  '2)L2
(fL  fH1 ')
: (22)
We can conduct the welfare analysis based on these indirect utility functions.
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4.1 The eect of trade liberalization
Trade liberalization signals falling trade costs (increasing '). By dierentiating
Eq. (21) and (22) with respect to ', we can obtain the following equations
@V1
@'
=
[('2 + 1)fL  2'fH1 ]
(   1)(1  '2)(fH1   fL')
> 0
@V2
@'
=
[('2 + 1)fH1   2'fL]
(   1)(1  '2)(fL  fH1 ')
> 0:
The second equation is satised because the following inequality must be satised
in the equilibrium,
 <
('2 + 1)fH1
2'fL
:
In addition, we analyze the eect on the welfare gap between countries. By
taking the dierence between Eqs. (21) and (22) and dierentiating it with respect
to ', we obtain
@(V H1   V L2 )
@'
=
(fL)2   (fH1 )2
(fL  fH1 ')(fH1   fL')
> 0:
Therefore, the result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 Falling trade costs increase the welfare levels in both countries and
widen the welfare gap between the countries
This is because falling trade costs decrease the prices of all imported manufacturing
goods, which increases their consumption. Hence, this increases the welfare level of
all consumers.
4.2 The eect of technology improvement
Next, we analyze the eects of technology improvement in the case of a technology
gap. We assume that technology improvement increases the productivity of the
high-technology type, which corresponds to increasing . Dierentiating Eqs. (21)
and (22) with respect to , we obtain the following
@V1
@
=

   1[
 1 +
fL'
fH1   fL'
] > 0 (23)
@V2
@
=
 fH1 '
(fL  fH1 ')
< 0 (24)
because
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
and (17) hold.
Proposition 4 In the technology-gap case, by increasing the productivity of the
high-technology type, the welfare of a consumer in country 1 increases and that of a
consumer in country 2 decreases.
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Figure 2: relationship between welfare and productivity
As well as the technology-gap case, we derive the welfare eect of the other cases
in the Appendix. Hence, we present the relationship between productivity and the
indirect utility for any  as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2(a) shows that improving the productivity of technology H always in-
creases the welfare level of consumers in country 1. On the other hand, Figure 2(b)
shows that the welfare level of consumers in country 2 decreases when the produc-
tivity level of technology H is at medium levels. In this case, the welfare of country
2 is always lower than the case when productivity is low. Why does this occur? The
reason is because increasing  has positive and negative eects on the consumption
level of goods produced in each country. The positive eect arises from an increase
of total demand of manufacturing goods produced in country 1. The negative eect
rises from a decrease of total demand of manufacturing goods produced in country
2. Whether technology improvement increases welfare depends on which eect is
larger for consumers in each country. For consumers in country 2, an increase of 
decreases the total demand of domestic goods, which are consumed without incur-
ring trade costs, and increases the total demand of imported goods, which do incur
trade costs. Hence, the former (negative) eect is larger than the latter (positive)
one. Conversely, country 1 has more benets from an increase of domestic goods
than a decrease of imported goods. Comparing the welfare level in country 2 be-
tween specialization patterns, Figure 2(b) also shows that the welfare level of the
technology-gap case is always lower than that of the low-technology case ( <
fH1
fL
).
Even if productivity becomes so high that rms in country 2 can employ technology
H(high technology case), there exists an area in which the welfare level in country 2
is still lower than that of the low-technology case( is slightly larger than
fH2
fL
). This
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implies that technology innovation works better for consumers in a high-technology
country, but if the technology level is medium, then, a small improvement of the
high-technology type makes those in low-technology country poorer by the presence
of trade cost. From Proposition 1 and 2, we show that increasing  has a negative
eect on welfare in country 2, which is opposite to decreasing trade costs. There-
fore, decreasing trade costs can avoid the formation of U-shaped indirect utility in
country 2. By total dierentiation of (22), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 To compensate for the welfare loss in country 2 from technology
improvement, trade costs have to be reduced by the following amount
d'
d
=
'(1  '2)
[(1 + '2)fL   2'fH1 )]
(< 0):
This proposition implies the importance of trade liberalization to keep the welfare
level in country 2 high. In particular, trade costs need to be reduced more if  is
slightly larger than
fH1
fL
, which is the threshold at which rms in country 1 change the
technology into a high type, since the above equation decreases with . In addition,
this result indicates that the low-technology country has a stronger incentive to
promote trade liberalization in order to keep the welfare level when its technology
is less developed. From Proposition 3, trade liberalization always works better for
the welfare of both the countries. Thus, with regard to the policy impacts on
social welfare, we should consider not only technology innovation but also trade
liberalization.
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we explain the relationship between the productivity level of technol-
ogy and technology choice when xed costs dier between countries. In addition, we
examine how technology innovation aects the technology choice of rms and the
welfare levels of consumers. Furthermore, we consider the eects of trade liberaliza-
tion on location choice and welfare levels. We develop a simple two-country trade
model with technology choice. Firms can choose a technology from two types (high
or low) and the number of rms is determined through free entry. The productivity
of the high-technology type is higher than that of the low-technology type, and high
technology is more costly than low technology. Moreover, we assume that there
is a large country and a small country, and that high technology employed in the
large country is made available at a lower cost than the same technology type in the
small country. The latter assumption means that a large country has an advantage
in adopting high technology.
We nd that in the equilibrium, rms locating in the developed country employ
higher technology and rms locating in the developing country employ lower tech-
nology. In addition, we nd that improving the productivity of higher technology
does not always improve consumer welfare in both counties. In particular, when the
productivity level of the high-technology type is medium, the welfare of a consumer
in the small country decreases with a small technological improvement.
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Finally, we comment on directions for future work. In this study, we analyze a
static trade model. In the future, we will extend this model to a dynamic model in
which the productivity of technology varies through time. In this paper, the eect of
investment on R&D is not considered, but such an extension should be investigated.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Assume a case in which rms in country 1 employ technology H. Then, H1 = 0
must be satised, that is, Eq. (11) is rewritten as follows
 1
   1 (L1P
 1
1 + 'L2P
 1
2 ) = f
H
1 : (25)
Substituting (25) into (12), we can rewrite Eq. (12) as follows
L1 =
fH1

  fL: (26)
If   fH1
fL
, the right-hand side of (26) is always positive, which induces rms to
employ technology L. Hence, this contradicts the case in which all rms employ
technology H. Therefore,
fH1
fL
<  must be satised. Next, assuming that L1 = 0,
the following equation is satised
 1
   1 (L1P
 1
1 + 'L2P
 1
2 ) = f
L: (27)
Substituting (27), we can rewrite Eq. (11) as follows
H1 = f
L  fH1 : (28)
Employing the same argument above, we can show that  <
fH1
fL
must be satised.
Similarly, the same fact for country 2 can be shown in the same way.
B Cases other than
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
When  <
fH1
fL
holds, any rm employs technology L because the productivity of
technology is not high enough to recover the xed cost of technology H. Therefore,
this case is consistent with Helpman and Krugman (1985). When
fH2
fL
<  holds, any
rm employs technology H because the productivity of technology H is high enough
to recover its xed cost. If H1 > 
H
2 , n
H
1 > 0 and n
H
2 = 0 are in equilibrium. From
Eq. (11),
nH1 =

fH1
(L1 + L2)
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holds. Substituting it into Eq. (12), T must satisfy the following equation
H2 =
('2L1 + L2)f
H
1   '(L1 + L2)fH2
'(L1 + L2)
< 0: (29)
Let ' satisfy the left-hand side of Eq. (29) is equal to zero. When ' > ', nH1 > 0
and nH2 = 0 is the equilibrium. Hence, we assume that ' < '. From free-entry
conditions, we consider the following equations
H1 = 
H
2 = 0:
The relationship between nH1 and n
H
2 is given by
nH1 =
'(L1 + L2)f
H
1   (L1 + '2L2)fH2
'(L1 + L2)fH2   ('2L1 + L2)fH1
nH2 : (30)
Then, substituting (30) into the free-entry condition H1 = 0, we can obtain the
number of manufacturing rms locating in country 1 and country 2 by
nH1 =
'(L1 + L2)f
H
1   (L1 + '2L2)fH2
(fH2   fH1 ')(fH2 '  fH1 )
(31)
,
nH2 =
'(L1 + L2)f
H
2   ('2L1 + L2)fH1
(fH2   fH1 ')(fH2 '  fH1 )
: (32)
In this case, the number of rms is independent from a.
C Derivation of Figure 2
When  <
fH1
fL
holds, all rms employ L technology. Then, indirect utility is obtained
as follows
V1 = 1  + [ln (   1)

+
1
   1 ln
(1 + ')L1
fL
]; (33)
V2 = 1  + [ln (   1)

+
1
   1 ln
(1 + ')L2
fL
]: (34)
This implies that the welfare level is independent from  because no rm employs
H technology. When
fH1
fL
<  <
fH2
fL
, rms locating in country 1 employ H technol-
ogy and rms locating in country 2 employ L technology. Then, indirect utility is
obtained as follows
V1 = 1  + [ln (   1)

+
1
   1 ln
(1  '2)L1
(fH1   fH2 ')
]; (35)
V2 = 1  + [ln (   1)

+
1
   1 ln
(1  '2)L2
(fH2   fH1 ')
]: (36)
Considering the eect of an increase in , we derive the following equations
@V1
@
=
@V2
@
=  1 > 0; (37)
@2V1
@2
=
@2V2
@2
=   2 < 0: (38)
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